

Law Law Land: The Effects of Sanctuary City Policies

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Abstract

From 2008 to 2017, cities and counties in 68 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas adopted sanctuary city policies, limiting local law enforcement's cooperation with federal immigration authorities in these jurisdictions. This paper examines the broader effects of these policies on city-level demographic, socioeconomic, and crime outcomes. My analysis utilizes a rich set of data including the American Community Survey (2006–2018), the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income migration flow (2006-2018), Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report (2006-2018), and the National Crime Victimization Survey (2006-2015). Using a staggered difference-in-differences framework, I estimate the policies' treatment effects and find that sanctuary policies had little to no effect on demographic and socioeconomic outcomes, but they are associated with increased crime reporting and decreases in both violent and property crime victimization, suggesting potential public safety benefits. Using a discrete choice model, I find that sanctuary policies function as weak pull factors, influencing migration patterns only marginally. Additionally, I find that the Hispanic population and the non-citizen population have polarizing perception of the policy in prior to 2013. While the policies provide significantly positive and negative utility to Hispanic individuals and non-citizens, respectively, the value for both converge and fluctuate together after 2013. The small estimates provides some justification to the estimated largely-null migration-driven effects on city characteristics. By providing a more rigorous empirical assessment of these policies, this study provides a clearer understanding of sanctuary city policies beyond political narratives and anecdotal evidence.

Keywords: Sanctuary City, Migration, Immigration Policy

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1 Introduction

Immigration policies have long been a heated topic in US politics, but sanctuary city policies have especially been in the hot seat since 2012, around the time of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) and Donald Trump's first presidential campaign. As much as immigration, like healthcare and education, is one of the hottest platforms in state and federal elections, there have been relatively few empirical studies on this topic. The elusive nature of data on undocumented immigration and the complexity of sub-national policies have made studies on the impacts of immigration policies difficult. In this paper, I focus on the effects of sanctuary city policies on the general population of cities. Instead of contending that any such effect is driven by undocumented immigrants, I hypothesize that sanctuary city policies serve as an amenity of the city to its residents, which can affect city-level characteristics via migration.

Sanctuary city policies offer a rich area for quantitative exploration, with existing studies showing diverse economic and social effects. Extant research highlight that these policies can increase labor force participation, reduce poverty, and lower crime rates (Wong, 2017), while other contexts, such as large immigration inflows, reveal adverse outcomes (Tumen, 2016). At the city level, I found that ever-sanctuary cities appear to be more attractive than never-sanctuary cities in general. Using a staggered difference-in-differences framework, I estimate the average treatment effects on the treated of sanctuary city policy on MSA-level migration, demographic, socioeconomic, and crime outcomes. Using the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income county-to-county migration data, I found that sanctuary city policies can weakly increase out-migration while weakly increasing the average adjusted gross income of in-migrants at the MSA level. Using the American Community Survey data, I find little to no evidence that sanctuary city policies affect the demographic composition and socioeconomic outcomes at the MSA level. Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report data and the National Crime Victimization Data, I found that sanctuary city policies appear to weakly increase crime reporting and decrease both violent crime victimization.

To unpack the largely-null effects of sanctuary city policies, I explore the value of the policy in individuals' migration decisions. These policies operate through two primary channels: direct protections for undocumented immigrants and signaling inclusivity to prospective residents. Before 2014, their scarcity heightened their protective value, enabling cities to uniquely enhance safety and foster law enforcement cooperation. After 2014, their proliferation shifted focus to their signaling value, attracting individuals seeking inclusive and ideologically aligned communities. Theoretically, these channels can contribute to any observed changes in migration patterns and city characteristics. For instance, the protective value may directly influence economic stability and social cohesion, while signaling value could reshape neighborhood demographics and preferences. Incorporating models like Schelling's dynamic framework may clarify how these channels interact, particularly in the context of migration decisions and residential sorting. Using a simple discrete choice models, I find that sanctuary city policies function as weak pull factors for Hispanic individuals and non-citizens. Quantifying the value of the policies as compensating distances, I found that while Hispanic individuals and non-citizens have polarizing perceptions of the policy in 2011 and 2012, they converge at around 40/60 miles and fluctuate together as low as -40 miles in 2015 and as high as 80 miles in 2017. The small estimated values of the policies are consistent with the observation of largely-null effects on city characteristics that are primarily changed by differences in migration patterns.

This paper serves as a more rigorous study on the equilibrium effects of sanctuary city policies on the cities that adopted them. The rest of this section provides an overview of immigration enforcement in the United States and explains the legal role sanctuary city policies play. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews relevant literature and lays out the framework used for my analyses. Section 3 describes the data used for the analyses and gives more detailed descriptions of sanctuary cities. Section 4 describes the results and inferences on both the individual migration decisions and the policy treatment effect on city-level racial, socioeconomic, and crime outcomes. Section 6 concludes with a summary of results and suggestions of future work.

1.1 The Role of Sanctuary City Policies

The term sanctuary city policy has been used in various contexts in the past, and it is only fairly recently used to define sub-national policies related to the protection of undocumented immigrants. I will first discuss the federal immigration laws that define undocumented immigration and then I will illustrate the role played by sanctuary city policies.

1.2 National (Federal) Immigration Laws

The federal government has two types of control on immigrants seeking entry in the United States (US): visa and status. Although commonly tied together, there is actually a big difference between the two. A valid visa simply grants an individual “parole”, which in this context means the permission to be examined for entry into the US. A valid status, instead grants the individual the legal right to stay in the US and it does not grant parole/entry. An undocumented immigrant is an individual staying in the US without a valid status.

A non-citizen’s status in the US is one of the three following coarse categories: permanent visitor, temporary visitor, and undocumented visitor. A permanent visitor is an individual with an immigrant visa status. These are statuses designed to transition an individual into a green card holder, also known as Legal Permanent Residents (LPR). LPR is the last status one needs to obtain before one can apply to naturalize and become a citizen. A temporary visitor is an individual with a non-immigrant visa status such as the F-1 student visa, B-2 Travel Visa, H1-B work visa, etc. Holders of non-immigrant visas need to adjust their status to an immigrant visa status before they can applied to become an LPR. The separation of visa and status means that an undocumented visitor is an individual staying in the US who either entered the country without parole/inspection or entered with a valid visa but subsequently lost their status and stayed past the designated grace period.

Entry without parole is when an individual entered the country circumventing immigration inspection.¹ An example of not holding legal status after entry with parole would be if an individual on a tourist visa (B-2) stayed in the US past their designated lawful presence period (typically 180 days) or if an F-1 student graduating and did not leave the country or adjust their status within the 90-day grace period.

¹This distinction is critical to make as current immigration law only allows for adjustment of status if one entered the country with inspection. For example, an undocumented immigrant who overstayed their F-1 student visa can transition to LPR through adjustment of status such as marriage with a citizen while an undocumented immigrant who crossed the border with mules cannot. See [USCIS](#).

Even though the media often portray the US as a country of immigrants, there has been a long history of racially targeted anti-immigration laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. After a series of recent reforms like the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (CIRA), the immigration system prioritizes the admission of family members of citizens and skilled labor. Also, IIRIRA formalized alienation of individuals with previous unlawful presence and created a sizeable legal barrier for legalization. Due to the many levels of government and law enforcement agencies, national immigration law is not enforced efficiently. Most enforcement requires inter-agency co-operation and hence leaves much room for sub-national laws at the state and local level.

1.3 Sub-National Immigration Laws

Because of the complexity of immigration enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has historically relied on local-level law enforcement through programs like *Secure Communities* and 287(g). These programs generally require local law enforcement to report, arrest, or further detain undocumented immigrants. After 2011, DHS changed the compliance to this cooperation from optional to mandatory. Backlashes and non-cooperation followed these changes by some local authorities, often citing insufficient law enforcement resources. Aside from Clarion county, PA², Lebanon county, PA³ and Hartford, CT⁴ were the first cities to announce their policy of non-cooperation, establishing the precedence of sanctuary city policies. The non-cooperative law enforcement nature also means that sanctuary city policies are not necessarily always announced by the city; in fact, they are often announced and executed at the county jail level. Many cities became sanctuary because the county sheriff announces that they will not hold any individuals solely for immigration purposes. Even if a city/county did not make an official announcement, non-cooperation makes a city de facto sanctuary, and the city is considered a sanctuary city by ICE.

1.4 Immigration Enforcement

Two separate agencies are responsible for federal-level immigration enforcements: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP's main jurisdiction is the 100-mile border zone, where they have the authority to conduct expedited removal (ACLU, 2018). Figure 2 traces out the interior border of the zone with a blue line. Expedited removal, introduced in IIRIRA, includes removing an undocumented immigrant without immigration proceedings before a judge, provided that the immigrant is within 100 air-miles of the land border and crossed the border within the last fourteen days (NILC, 2006). In 2019⁵ and 2025, the Trump administration expanded the scope of expedited removal to include immigrants anywhere in the United States who have been in the country for less than two years (Department of Homeland

²Will not hold individuals solely based on ICE detainer; requires legal and authorized commitment paperwork (County Corrections Policy, 1997)

³Will not hold individuals solely on ICE detainers. Will send weekly reports to ICE about newly incarcerated individuals, and allows ICE to access the facility and records (County Correctional Facility's Policy, 2008)

⁴Will not arrest or detain a person based solely on their immigration status unless there is a criminal warrant (Article XXI - City Services Relating To Immigration Status (Ord. No. 20-08, 8-11-2008))

⁵This was later reversed by the Biden administration.

Security, 2025). CBP is also the agency responsible for immigration inspections at points of entry into the US, typically the immigration inspection checkpoints at the border.

On the other hand, ICE handles immigration enforcement within the country and outside of the 100-mile border zone after an individual in the US no longer holds valid status and did not exit the country before their designated grace period. The typical immigration raids reported by the media are conducted by ICE and sometimes in cooperation with local law enforcement. Under 287(g) and Secure Communities, local law enforcement would notify ICE if an arrested individual is an undocumented immigrant. Often times, those same authorities will honor a detainer issued by ICE, instead of a judge, to hold an individual for the violation of immigration law.

Contrary to the popular rhetoric, the unlawful presence of an immigrant in the United States is not a criminal matter unless the individual was previously removed from the country and then returned without permission (ACLU, 2017). This distinction means that most immigration proceedings are held in immigration courts and not criminal courts; hence undocumented immigrants are not entitled to a public defense attorney in most cases. The flip side of this non-criminal nature is that if the local jurisdiction does not criminalize immigration offenses, it could restrict local law enforcement's ability to cooperate with ICE, thus enabling the most common form of sanctuary city policies.


1.5 Sanctuary City Policies as Local Non-Compliant Policies

Although there is no concrete legal definition, sanctuary city policies, in general, are policies that protect non-criminal undocumented immigrants. These policies can be regulations such as requiring local law enforcement not to honor an ICE detainer request, requiring local law enforcement to not take enforcement actions solely based on an individual's immigration status, or refusing to inform ICE the detention of undocumented individuals. In 2014, California and Connecticut enacted their own *Trust Acts* and became the only two states with state-level sanctuary policy. Within these two states, there were still city-level sanctuary policies, and there were also counties that refuse to follow the state-level sanctuary policy. In the same year, all county jails in Colorado, Rhode Island, and New Mexico also instituted sanctuary city policies that refuse to honor a detainer issued by ICE without a judicial warrant. Figure 1 below briefly describes the timeline of sanctuary city policy adoption up to 2017. The ICE Declined Detainer Report is included in Appendix B with the details of each policies adoption year and their contents. Notably, sanctuary state laws were also met with resistance by state and local governments. For example, Texas Legislature (2017) outlawed local sanctuary policies, City of Los Alamitos (2018) in Orange County, CA declared that the California Values Act did not apply to them, this was retracted two years later as part of the settlement of a suit filed by the Los Alamitos Community United (ACLU Southern California, 2020). More recently, the City of Huntington Beach (2025) declared itself non-sanctuary following the new executive order.

The non-compliant nature of these undocumented-immigrant-friendly policies played a significant role in President Donald J. Trump's anti-immigration agenda before and after he was elected. In 2017, president Trump issued an executive order titled, "Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States" (Executive Office of the President, 2017). This order requires local law enforcement to comply with ICE, or they would lose eligibility for federal grants intending for public safety, except when deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes. This order put undocumented immigration front and center in the national discussion and started a legal

Figure 1: Timeline of Sanctuary City Policies Up to 2017

Timeline of Sanctuary City Policy Adoption in Metropolitan Statistical Areas



war between the federal and local governments. In January 2018, District Judge John A. Mendez ruled against the Trump administration and denied their request to suspend California’s statewide sanctuary policy, deeming it not an obstacle to ICE’s actions (Fuller, 2018). Following that ruling, many circuit courts ruled against the executive order while a select few ruled in favor of it. This executive order and the ensuing legal battles add a substantial cost associated with sanctuary city policies on top of the ideological stances and further complicates the issue. On January 20th, 2025, president Trump issued executive order 14159 titled, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion” which reinstates his previous order of halting funding to sanctuary cities, threatens local law enforcement with prosecution, and sets the stage for the expansions of other immigration enforcement policies, including expedited removals (Executive Office of the President, 2025). This executive action led to the federal government filing a suit against the state of Illinois and the city of Chicago (United States v. Illinois, 2025), while getting push-backs from sanctuary cities/counties reacted similarly and filing suits against this order (City of San Francisco, 2025; Reuters, 2025).

2 Diversity, Migration, and Immigration Politics

To the best of my knowledge, there are few quantitative studies about the effects of sanctuary city policies. Wong (2017) looked at the effects of sanctuary city policies and found an increase in labor force participation and median household income and a decrease in crime, poverty, and unemployment. Other relevant studies such as Tumen (2016) looked at the impact of a measurable immigration influx and found the opposite effects in the Turkey/Syria border using the Syrian refugee resettlement as an exogenous shock.

In terms of the migration effect of policies related to immigration, current research has similar findings. Andersson et al. (2018) found that an increase of immigrants in a racially homogeneous neighborhood reduces the neighborhood’s average disposable income and education level and increases natives’ outflow while not having a statistically significant effect on inflow. They also showed that this effect is the opposite in neighborhoods that did not start with homogeneity. On the US census tract level, Saiz and Wachter (2011) found similar results, as well as a decrease in housing values after immigrants moved into homogeneous neighborhoods, and the effect is opposite for neighborhoods that started with less homogeneity.

On the other hand, we can infer some information from the Moving To Opportunity (MTO)

literature and works applying the Schelling (1969, 1971) framework to study migration decisions such as Caetano and Maheshri (2017). From MTO, we know that migration decisions can be highly restricted by poverty (Aliprantis, 2014; Bergman et al., 2019), which could suppress the revelation of preferences. Extending the framework of these papers, I assume that Hispanic individuals' preferences for sanctuary city policies may interact differently with social and private amenities such as schooling, housing, diversity, opportunities, etc. than non-Hispanic individuals. The similar case can also be made about the preferences of non-citizens. This information enables me to more generally form a hypothesis on what contributes to migration decisions and how to correctly estimate the effect of sanctuary city policy on migration decisions.

2.1 Private Amenities

Private amenities are amenities specific to the individual, including amenities such as income, job opportunities, education, housing, consumption, etc. In terms of the labor market, Albert (2021) showed that undocumented immigrants are in a separate labor market from the labor market of documented immigrants and the natives. Hence the increase of labor supply caused by sanctuary city policies through in-migration of undocumented immigrants should only affect a non-undocumented immigrant's expectation of job prospects and not their actual job prospects. Albert (2021) further suggested that documented immigrants diminish the job prospects of natives. Therefore, sanctuary city policies will have complicated effects on the job market for natives depending on whether it attracts or deters documented immigrants.

In terms of primary and secondary education, people who move between cities just for education should be almost negligible in aggregate; otherwise, residential sorting for high-quality education would be widely observed at the city-level, and not by school districts. In terms of housing, the cost of renting or owning takes up part of one's income and leaves the rest for consumption. This implies an implicit substitution in housing and consumption that, on a large scale, could be captured in income.

2.2 Social Amenities

Social amenities are emergent amenities that are the results of aggregated characteristics of residents in a city (Caetano & Maheshri, 2017). These include characteristics such as racial composition, population education attainment, median household income, unemployment rate, etc. In the case of migration, the social amenities are the pull factors of a city that include the ones listed above as well as hard to observe factors such as ideological/political leaning of a city. Under the framework proposed by Caetano and Maheshri (2017), how groups of people value these social amenities may also be different. For example, documented immigrants may prefer not to live in a sanctuary city due to toxic ties (Del Real, 2019) and the belief of increased immigration policing from ICE (Correal et al., 2020). On the other hand, the ideological meaning of sanctuary city policies can be attractive to both documented and undocumented immigrants. The key to studying migration choices is then to estimate how the social amenities factor into the decision process for people of select observable characteristics.

2.3 Amenity Values of Sanctuary City Policies

My hypothesis is that sanctuary city policies mainly provide two types of amenity to a city's residents. Sanctuary city policies can serve as some form of direct protection for undocumented immigrants. The protective values can both attract and retain undocumented immigrants (Lozada, 2017). Such protection also has spillover effects onto other residents of the city since sanctuary city policies can encourage undocumented immigrants' cooperation with local law enforcements and lead to lower crime rates (Martinez et al., 2017; Martinez-Schuldt & Martinez, 2021; Wong, 2017); they can also increase immigration enforcement from ICE/CBP (Correal et al., 2020). In addition, sanctuary city policies can serve as a signal of "welcoming" for the city, attracting individuals who would prefer to live in an environment where they can feel more sense of belonging. All else equal, the two types of amenity can be observed separately due to the staggered adoption timeline. In 2014, the number of sanctuary cities increased from nine to 54, leading to an abundant supply of sanctuary cities. This means the sanctuary city policies instituted before 2014 are scarce, making the effects of the first type of amenity more pronounced. After 2014, sanctuary cities are less scarce, and the changes in the estimated values of the policy could be thought of as the value of the second type of amenity. However, the adoption of the deferred action for childhood arrival (DACA) in 2012 and the deferred action for parents of Americans (DAPA) in 2014 can blur the lines between the estimated values of these two amenities. Not only did these policies put undocumented immigrants in the spotlight, the ensuing political battles regarding these policies can further solidify residents' pre-conceived notions of sanctuary city policies and undocumented immigrants (Balch, 2016; Kaba et al., 2019).

3 Data

To study how sanctuary city policies interact with private and social amenities in individual migration decisions, I use the following data sets:

1. 1-Year American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006 to 2018 provided by Integrated Public Use Micro data Series (Ruggles et al., 2025).
2. Statistics of income U.S. population migration data from 2006 to 2018 provided by the Internal Revenue Service (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 2025).
3. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report (UCR) from 2006 to 2018 provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2023).⁶
4. National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) MSA Public-Use from 2006 to 2015 provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research study 38321 (United States. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2022).

The 1-year ACS provided by IPUMS offers a robust dataset for analyzing the effects of sanctuary city policies at both the individual and metropolitan levels. At the individual level, the ACS

⁶The data is reported by FBI but cleaned and categorized by ICPSR. The full citation of all 13 studies used to construct this data is included in references.

provides yearly cross sections of representative microdata, allowing for precise estimation how demographic and economic characteristics interact with policy effects. These characteristics include race, employment status, income, 1-year migration history, and citizenship, facilitating the examination of how sanctuary city policies affect mobility patterns. At the city level, the survey provides consistent geographic identifiers for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), enabling a systematic comparison of trends across sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities. The balanced panel of cities enables me to study policy effects dynamically, capturing both short-term adjustments and longer-term shifts. These features make the ACS a valuable data source for evaluating how sanctuary policies shape economic and demographic outcomes across urban areas.

Since ACS data is the 1% population sample with sampling weights calculated based on the decennial Census, it may provide imprecise estimates for migration flows. Instead, for migration flow between MSAs, I employ the IRS-SOI migration data which tracks county-to-county migration using filing addresses to supplement my analysis on migration flow between MSAs. This data also reports the total adjusted gross income for both movers and non-movers and can be used to supplement analysis on the income level of movers.

The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) provides monthly reported crime data across law enforcement agencies (LEAs) across the United States, making it well-suited for analyzing the effects of sanctuary city policies on reported crime outcomes. Collected by the FBI from local law enforcement agencies, the UCR ensures consistency in crime classification and reporting, allowing for direct comparisons across jurisdictions. The data include granular crime categories beyond the standard violent and property crimes, enabling an assessment of whether sanctuary policies correlate with changes in overall crime rates or specific offenses. However, it is a known issue that crime reports at the LEA level is difficult to aggregate accurately due to overlapping borders of jurisdictions and geographic borders (United States. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018). Using the crosswalk files provided by United States. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2018) and Missouri Census Data Center (2014), I am able to accurately aggregate the LEA level crime statistics to the MSA level from 2006 to 2018.

The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provides a more comprehensive measure of crime than the UCR by capturing both reported and unreported offenses. Unlike the UCR, which relies on police records, the NCVS collects self-reported victimization data to estimate actual crime rates. Its longitudinal structure allows for tracking victimization trends independent of law enforcement practices, making it a valuable alternative for assessing the effects of sanctuary city policies on crime. The public-use version of NCVS at the MSA level only include 52 MSAs (as opposed to the 224 MSAs used in my analysis) and years prior to 2016. I use the NCVS outcomes to estimate the effects of sanctuary city policies on actual crime rates.

Finally, for the accurate record of sanctuary cities, I use the Declined Detainer Report of Feb 17, 2017 furnished by ICE. This report provides information on sanctuary city location, ICE area of responsibility, the source of the policy, policy content (level of non-cooperation), and the month/year of the policy enactment. The full report is included in Appendix B.

3.1 Sample Restrictions

Since most sanctuary city policies are announced and enforced at the county jail level, I map these policies to the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that include the relevant counties. MSAs are chosen over counties because they encompass a broader area, capturing the interconnected

social and economic activities within a region. Additionally, undocumented immigrants often rely on word-of-mouth information on immigration enforcements, making it difficult for the accurate conveyance of the geographic limits of sanctuary city policies (Bloch et al., 2014; Callaghan et al., 2019; Newell et al., 2016).

This ensures that the analysis reflects the wider impact of policies that, even when implemented at the city level, are likely to influence the entire MSA due to the integrated nature of labor markets, commuting patterns, and regional services. This approach excludes sanctuary policies in rural counties not part of an MSA. The ACS adjusted its geographic coverage in 2013, transitioning from the 2000 Census definition to the 2010 Census definition. Although IPUMS provides a consistent geographic variable, *met2013*, harmonizing MSA definitions over time, some MSAs appear in only part of the sample period. To create a balanced panel, I limit the analysis to MSAs that are present continuously from 2006 to 2018, resulting in a total of 224 MSAs across thirteen years. To analyze crime rates within the MSAs, I utilize data from the UCR and NCVS to examine potential changes in crime reporting and criminal incidents, respectively. However, data availability imposes certain limitations: the UCR includes only data from law enforcement agencies that can be matched to the in-sample MSAs, and the NCVS public-use data at the MSA level is available only for the years 2006–2015.

3.2 Ever-Sanctuary Cities vs. Never-Sanctuary Cities

By 2017, there are a total of sixty-two sanctuary MSAs and five sanctuary states.⁷ Figure 2 shows the locations as well as the adoption timeline of sanctuary cities. The majority of sanctuary cities are within the 100-mile border zone for expedited removal, meaning that these cities would not use their law enforcement resources to aid removal operations of either ICE or CBP.

Table 2 reports summary statistics for 2006, 2014, and 2018 city characteristics used in this study, distinguishing between metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that had adopted sanctuary policies by 2017 and those that had not. Of the 224 MSAs in the sample, 62 are classified as ever-sanctuary, while 162 are never-sanctuary. Differences between these groups remain largely stable over time. On average, ever-sanctuary cities have nearly three times the population of never-sanctuary cities and exhibit significantly higher levels of racial heterogeneity. In terms of migration patterns, inflows and outflows appear comparable across both groups. Similarly, poverty rates show no substantial differences. However, home-ownership rates are, on average, five percentage points higher in never-sanctuary cities than in ever-sanctuary cities.

Median household income is consistently higher in ever-sanctuary cities, with the income gap widening over time—from approximately \$8,700 in 2006 to \$9,600 in 2014, and further to \$13,000 in 2018. A similar trend is observed in rental housing costs, where ever-sanctuary cities exhibit a persistent and increasing premium over never-sanctuary cities. By contrast, the difference in median home-ownership costs remains stable at approximately \$500 per month across all three years.

Demographic composition also varies systematically between the two groups. Gender distributions are comparable, with women comprising roughly half of the population in both city types. The share of white and Black residents is approximately 10 and 6 percentage points higher, re-

⁷California and Connecticut have state-level legislation while Colorado, New Mexico, and Rhode Island have state-wide county jail policies.

spectively, in never-sanctuary cities, where they constitute about 70 percent and 13 percent of the population. Conversely, the shares of Asian and Hispanic residents in ever-sanctuary cities are approximately twice as high as in never-sanctuary cities. Naturalized citizens and non-citizens are also twice as prevalent in ever-sanctuary cities. Educational attainment follows a similar pattern: while the share of residents with a high school degree or less is nearly identical across both groups, ever-sanctuary cities have a college-educated share that is approximately four percentage points higher. Employment rates are comparable between the two city types, though ever-sanctuary cities exhibit a slightly higher share of single individuals. Finally, ever-sanctuary cities have a lower reported violent crime rate but a higher property crime victimization rate than never-sanctuary cities.

Overall, ever-sanctuary cities are characterized by larger populations, greater racial and ethnic heterogeneity, have a higher cost of living and a larger proportion of college-educated residents. In contrast, never-sanctuary cities are smaller in population, have a higher share of white and Black residents, and exhibit higher home-ownership rates. Despite these differences, the two city types display similar patterns in migration flows, poverty rates, and employment levels, with ever-sanctuary cities differing primarily in their demographic composition.

4 The City-Level Effects of Sanctuary City Policies

My initial task is to assess whether sanctuary city policies exert measurable marginal effects on the likelihood of migration overall. Figure 3 shows the share of movers moving from/to ever-sanctuary MSAs from 2008 to 2017 along with the progression of the number of MSAs with sanctuary city policies. Holding the MSAs' sanctuary status in 2017 fixed, the migration pattern appears to be stable over time. MSAs that becomes sanctuary by 2017 consistently take in slightly more than 50% of all movers moving to MSAs, indicating that the average ever-sanctuary MSA is much more attractive to migrants than the average never-sanctuary MSA. Since there are 62 ever-sanctuary MSAs as opposed to 162 never-sanctuary MSAs, this figure indicates that ever-sanctuary MSAs are over 2.5x more likely to be a migration destinations for the average mover than never-sanctuary MSAs.

Figure 4 shows the share of movers moving from/to sanctuary MSAs from 2008 to 2017 along with the progression of the number of MSAs with sanctuary city policies. The large increase in the group of movers moving between sanctuary MSAs (SC) corresponds with the large addition of sanctuary cities in 2014. As the number of sanctuary MSAs increased, so do the shares of movers moving from and to sanctuary MSAs. The decreasing share of movers moving between non-sanctuary MSAs appears to be largely mechanical and provides little additional information regarding individuals' preference of sanctuary city policies.

4.1 Estimating Policy Effects with Staggered Difference-in-Differences Approach

Since sanctuary city policies have a staggered adoption timeline, I use the staggered difference-in-differences with regression adjustment approach as described in Sant'Anna and Zhao (2020) and Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) of

sanctuary city policies. Formally, I estimate:

$$ATT(g, t) = E \left[\frac{G_g}{E[G_g]} (Y_t - Y_{g-1} - E[Y_t - Y_{g-1} | X, \text{NeverSanctuary}]) \right] \quad (1)$$

where Y_t represents the outcomes of interest, X_t are the relevant controls variables including population size, share of college educated individuals, unemployment rate, share of female individuals, share of Hispanic individuals, share of non-citizens, DUH, share of married individuals, logged median household income, share of homeowners, logged median cost of owning, logged median cost of renting, and share of households under 185% of the federal poverty line. t represents the year, g represents treatment cohorts—the year sanctuary city policy is first adopted in the city—and G_g is the indicator that is unity if a city is in cohort g .

By virtue of the regression adjustment approach, the estimation of Equation (1) is the estimation of differences in conditional mean after policy adoption. For practicality, I present the event-study aggregated estimates across policy adoption timeline. While it may be difficult to claim the estimated effects causal given the complexity of equilibrium city-level aggregate outcomes and the small number of sanctuary cities, it is a useful exercise to provide robust estimates of the correlations between sanctuary city policies and city characteristics. Lastly, note that all of the staggered difference-in-differences estimation presented here use city population weights in the estimation.

Effects on Migration—To examine whether sanctuary city policies constitute a pull or push factor in migration decisions, I first estimate Equation (1) using in-migration and out-migration as outcome (omitting out-migration in X_t). The estimates are plotted in Figure 6 and appear to be quite imprecise for most years. Nevertheless, while in-migration does not appear to be correlated with policy adoption, it appears that out-migration slowly increases after policy adoption.

Effects on Demographic Compositions—To explore how sanctuary city policies may have influenced race-based sorting related to preference heterogeneity by racial groups, I estimate Equation (1) using % Hispanic, % Non-Citizens, Descriptive Unit of Heterogeneity (DUH), and Gini-Simpson Index (GSI) as outcomes. The DUH and the GSI (Gini, 1912; Simpson, 1949) are measures of racial heterogeneity on the scale from zero to 100. GSI approximates the probability that two randomly chosen people in a city are from the same racial group but it over-weighs large groups, leading to poor inference on changes in the shares of minority groups. DUH balances the influence of the largest group and the evenness of the minority groups. GSI is invariant to the number of groups used in its calculation while DUH is not. In this paper, unless mentioned otherwise, all GSI and DUH use the five coarse racial groups provided by ACS: Black, White, American Indian, Hispanic, and Asian and other

The estimated treatment effects by policy year are shown in Figure 8. Panel (a) shows no evidence that sanctuary city policies affect the share of Hispanic population, while panel (c) indicates a lagged decrease in the share of non-citizens. Panels (b) and (d) suggests that sanctuary city policies do not affect racial heterogeneity in cities.

Effects on the Distribution of Wage Income—One common concern with the undocumented immigrants labor force is that these immigrants are paid at a much lower wage than the competitive wage in low-wage jobs. Under this assumption, sanctuary MSAs which attract many undocumented immigrants can experience decreased wages. This effect can be especially salient and proportionally large for the low-wage native workers. To examine the effects of sanctuary city policies on the distribution of wage income, I focus on ACS respondents between the ages of 25 and 64. I separate these respondents into citizens and non-citizens and use the following four

outcome variables: % of people earning non-positive wage income and, conditional on earning non-zero wage income, the first, second, and third quartile of the distribution of wage income. The results are shown in Figures 9 and 10.

Although imprecisely estimated, the point estimates panel (a) of Figure 9 display yearly decreases in the share of citizen non-earners between the ages of 25 and 64 in sanctuary MSAs after policy adoption. Across panels (b) through (d), the policies appear to have no effects on the three quartiles of the distribution of wage income. Similarly in Figure 10, adopting sanctuary city policies appear to have no effect on either the share of non-earners or the three quartiles of the distribution of wage income for non-citizens between the ages of 25 and 64.

Effects on Socioeconomic Outcomes—I explore whether sanctuary city policies affected any socioeconomic outcomes using Figure 11. I estimate Equation (1) with log(median household income), log(median monthly rental cost), % of college educated individuals, and unemployment rate (%) as outcomes while excluding these variables from the controls X_t .

In panel (a), sanctuary city policies appear to have a positive effect median household income, raising median household income by about 2%, aside from the positive but imprecisely estimated positive pre-trend. In panel (b), there is a positive trend on rental cost in ever-sanctuary cities across policy adoption timeline. The trend appears unaffected by policy adoption. Panels (c) and (d) shows little evidence that sanctuary city policies affected either the share of college-educated individual or the unemployment rates of sanctuary cities. This result is consistent with the Albert (2021) in that even if sanctuary city policies do attract undocumented immigrants, these immigrant compete in a different labor market than the natives and documented immigrants.

Additionally, using the IRS-SOI data, I examine whether sanctuary city policies have any effects on the income level of people moving into/from sanctuary MSAs, i.e., whether income-based heterogeneity in preference for the policy exists. Figure 7 presents the estimated effects of sanctuary city policy on the logged average adjusted gross income (AGI) of in-migrants and out-migrants. Even though the estimates are imprecise, panel (a) shows that the average in-migrant’s AGI appears to increase two to four years after policy adoption, by up to nine percent. On the other hand, policy adoption appears to have no correlation with changes in the average out-migrant’s AGI.

Effects on Crime—Finally, I examine the effects of sanctuary city policies on crime rate. For this task, I focus on the coarse categorization of property vs. violent crimes. For crime outcomes, I use two measures: Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). UCR reports crime rates as either actual or unfounded, but both measures only counts reported crimes. There are two main channels that sanctuary city policies can affect reported crime rate. First, sanctuary city policies can lead to more reporting from both undocumented immigrants and those close to them, since these policies remove the threat of potential immigration enforcements when interacting with local law enforcements Martinez et al. (2017) and Martinez-Schuldt and Martinez (2021). Second, since ICE largely relies on local law enforcement cooperation through 287(g), sanctuary city policies remove the burden of local law enforcements and free up their capacity to investigate more crimes. If either channel is salient, it can lead to lowered crime rates overall due to improved efficiency in criminal investigations; such effects would be captured in changes in NCVS.

Figure 12 plots the event-study estimates on both actual and unfounded violent and property crime rates from UCR; note that the 4 graphs have different scales on the y-axes. Panel (a) and (b) show upward trends in reported actual crime rate before policy adoption and the trends flatten with most estimates positive but statistically insignificant after policy adoption. Panel (c) shows a flat

pre-trend of reported unfounded violent crime and a gradual increase after policy adoption. Panel (d) no evidence that the policies had any effects on the rate of reported unfounded property crime.

Figure 13 reports the estimated effects of sanctuary city policies on crime victimization. Note that the NCVS public-use data is very limited and the sample of this figure is limited to only 52 large MSAs, 20 of which became sanctuary by 2015, and four more by 2017. This means the estimates for five or more years after policy adoption is unreliable given that Hartford, CT is the only city that can be used to identify that estimate.⁸

Panel (a) shows a fluctuating pre-trend in violent crime victimization before policy adoption. Though imprecisely estimated due to the small sample, in the four years after sanctuary city policy adoption, violent crime victimization decreased drastically by around 20 incidences per 1,000 residents. Panel (b) show no evidence of immediate effect of sanctuary city policies on property crime victimization, though the point estimates show a negative trend after policy adoption while having no apparent pre-trend.

Combining Figure 12 and Figure 13, it appears that sanctuary city policies weakly increase crime reporting and decrease violent crime victimization, likely resulting in safer cities.

4.2 Estimating with Different Control MSAs

One consistent issue with the results presented in the last subsection is that most of the estimates appear to be rather imprecise. This is likely due to the small sample issue as well as the fact that many cities could simply be not comparable. Although there does not seem to exist a natural and straight forward solution to the small sample issue, I address the comparable control group issue in this subsection by re-estimating Figures 6 through 12 using (1) the common support sample, (2) the no California sample, and (3) the Only Neighboring MSA sample.

Common support sample—Figure 5 presents the average marginal effects of components of the control variables in X_t on the probability of sanctuary city status by 2017. The share of Hispanic population in a city in 2006/2007 weakly predicts sanctuary city status by 2017. Although imprecisely estimated, lower out-migration (weakly) and higher median cost of owning a home (strongly) also predicts sanctuary city status by 2017.

To construct the common support sample, I use the logistics regression estimates in Figure 5 for 2006 to predict propensity score of an MSA becoming sanctuary by 2017. I then restrict the sample to cities with a propensity score between the maximum of minimum propensity scores and the minimum of maximum propensity scores in ever- and never-sanctuary cities. This process ensures that only cities that have similar probability of becoming sanctuary cities by 2017 were used in estimating the effects. This sub-sample consists of 192 MSAs with 144 never-sanctuary MSAs and 48 ever-sanctuary MSAs as opposed to 162 never-sanctuary MSAs and 62 ever-sanctuary MSAs in the full sample.

No California sample—A striking fact about Figure 2 is that there are significantly more MSAs in California than any other state. While many MSAs in California adopted sanctuary city policies independent of the state law, the state-level law nonetheless makes the interpretation of the estimates opaque. At best, the state-level policy is completely redundant when an MSA has a separate policy; at worst, the state-level policy is not followed by MSAs that do not have their own policy. The effects and values of sanctuary city policies in California MSAs can thus be quite different

⁸Figure 14 replicates Figure 12 using the same limited sample. The results are qualitatively similar.

from those of non-California MSAs. As such, proper inferences on policy effects cannot be made without performing the same analysis on a sample excluding all of California. This sub-sample consists of 202 MSAs with 162 never-sanctuary MSAs and 40 ever-sanctuary MSAs as opposed to 62 ever-sanctuary MSAs out of 224 MSAs in the full sample.

Only Neighboring MSAs sample—Another striking observation from Figure 2 is that there are many never-sanctuary MSAs that are not close to any ever-sanctuary MSAs. As such, using all never-sanctuary MSAs as the comparison MSAs could include too many MSAs that are not comparable to sanctuary MSAs. My attempt to approach this issue is to only include the nearest five never-sanctuary cities. This sub-sample consists of 129 MSAs with 67 never-sanctuary MSAs and 62 ever-sanctuary MSAs as opposed to 162 never-sanctuary MSAs in the full sample. Aside from the worsened small sample issue, one potential concern is that effects can be over-estimated if the salient effects are driven by local changes between MSAs.

Figures A1 through A24 present the event-study estimates of each outcome variable using the different samples. In each figure, panel (a) through (d) present the estimates from the full sample, the common support sample, the No California sample, and the Only Neighboring MSAs sample, respectively. Each figure corresponds to an outcome variable from the main results, in the order they were presented. Overall, the estimated effects of sanctuary city policies are rather consistent across the different sub-samples. As is expected with using the sub-samples, the estimates are imprecise due to the worsening of the existing small sample issues with additional sample restrictions.

5 Estimating the Amenity Value(s) of Sanctuary City Policies

This paper investigates a central question: What are the consequences of sanctuary city policies for the cities that implement them? If such policies act as significant amenities shaping migration decisions for a meaningful portion of the mobile population, they could influence the demographic composition of both sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities. As discussed in Section 4, estimating the effects in aggregate can be difficult due to preference heterogeneity. In fact, I find limited evidence indicating that sanctuary city policies have measurable effects on a city’s demographic composition. In principle, the null results can either be truly null, null because of canceling effects, or null because the effects are marginal and difficult to estimate with city-level data. To further investigate the driver of these null results, I examine how sanctuary city policies can factor into the individual’s migration decision as a city-level amenity.

I adopt a hedonic model to approximate the value of sanctuary city policies in migration decisions where the indirect utility an individual i gets from living in city c in year t is:

$$v_{ict} = \beta_{S,t} \mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{ct}\} + \underbrace{\psi}_{\text{Social Amenities}} S_{ct} + \underbrace{\phi}_{\text{Private Amenities}} X_{ict} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{ict}}_{\text{Unobserved Preferences}}. \quad (2)$$

This means the probability of person i preferring and moving to c' from c can be written as:

$$P(v_{ic't} - v_{ict} > 0) = P\left(\beta_{S,t}(\mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{c't} = 1\} - \mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{ct} = 1\}) + \psi(S_{c't} - S_{ct}) + \phi(X_{ic't} - X_{ict}) > \varepsilon_{ict} - \varepsilon_{ic't}\right). \quad (3)$$

Notice that since moving costs directly impact consumption, it is included in the vector of private amenities. As a result, the estimated coefficients in Equation (3) can be normalized against the coefficient of distance moved and interpreted as compensating differentials of each amenity.

For computational feasibility, I assume that each person living in city c has a consideration set $C(c, t)$ that includes city c and the top-20 destination-cities of migrants from city c in year $t - 1$. Let ε_{ict} be distributed according to the Type-I Extreme Value distribution, the probability of individual i choosing to live in city c among cities in $C(c, t)$ in year t can be written as:

$$P\left(v_{ict} > \max_{c' \in C(c, t)} \{v_{ic't}\}\right) = \frac{e^{\beta_{S,t} \mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{ct}=1\} + \beta_d \text{Dist}_c + \beta_{d2} \text{Dist}_c^2 + \psi S_{ct} + \phi X_{ict}}}{\sum_{c' \in C(c, t)} e^{\beta_{S,t} \mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{c't}=1\} + \beta_d \text{Dist}_{c'} + \beta_{d2} \text{Dist}_{c'}^2 + \psi S_{c't} + \phi X_{ic't}}}. \quad (4)$$

In Equation (4), I separate the terms $\beta_d \text{Dist}_c$ and $\beta_{d2} \text{Dist}_c^2$ —the quadratic form of the centroid distance between individual i 's origin MSA and MSA c , as a proxy of moving costs—from the vector of private amenity $X_{i,c,t}$. In order to determine whether sanctuary city policies are pull factors, I estimate the marginal effects of sanctuary city policy on the probability of out-migration. Following Equation (4), the probability of out-migration as a function of private and social amenities can be written as Equation (5). I assume that the salient private amenities include (1) household income relative to the median in the city, (2) housing costs relative to the median in the city, and (3) personal characteristics including education, employment status, marital status, sex, race, and citizenship. I assume that salient social amenities include (1) population size, (2) unemployment rate, (3) share of college educated individuals, and (4) out-migration of the city.

$$P_i(\text{Leaving City } c \text{ in year } t) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{\beta_{S,t-1} \mathbb{1}\{\text{Sanctuary}_{c,t-1}\} + \psi S_{c,t-1} + \phi X_{ict}}}. \quad (5)$$

Figure 15 presents the estimated marginal effects for the full population from 2008 to 2017 using Equation (5), depicted by the black dashed line, while also disaggregating these effects by racial groups (Asian and Other, Black, Hispanic, and White) and citizenship statuses (born citizen, naturalized citizen, and non-citizen), shown in color.

In panel (a), the trends suggest significant heterogeneity across racial groups. The Black population (light green) exhibits the largest early fluctuations, with a sharp increase around 2012, followed by a steep decline in 2013. The Asian and Other group (dark green) also experiences volatility, particularly around 2012 and 2015. In contrast, the White (blue) and Hispanic (light blue) populations display more stable trends, with average marginal effects closer to the pooled estimates over time. The stable negative estimates in effects on out-migration after 2013 suggests that sanctuary city policies serve as weak pull factors that decrease probability of out-migration. The effects are more salient for the Hispanic and Black population. Panel (b) extends this analysis by differentiating individuals based on citizenship status instead. The effects for naturalized citizens and born citizens show relatively stable trends, with naturalized citizens experiencing a slight upward trajectory toward the latter part of the sample period. The pull factor effects of sanctuary city policies is most salient for non-citizens. The divergence in out-migration patterns between non-citizens and other groups provides some evidence against the theory of toxic ties.

Given Figure 15, I focus on the amenity value of sanctuary city policies for Hispanic and Non-Citizens. I estimate the conditional logistics regression as specified in Equation (4). The vector $X_{i,c',t}$ comprises of the centroid distance between the residence MSA (c) of individual i in year $t - 1$

and all the MSAs (c') that are in i 's reasonable choice set $C(c, t)$ and an indicator variable that is unity if $c \neq c'$. $\xi_{c',t}$ is MSA characteristics including the share of Hispanic population, the share of non-citizens, racial heterogeneity (DUH), the share of college-educated individuals, in-/out-migration, unemployment rate, and the natural log of median household income, cost of renting, and cost of owning. This functional form allows me to interpret the negative ratio between and the coefficient on distance as the compensating distance $CD_t = \frac{\beta_{S,t}}{\beta_d}$ that sanctuary city policies provides.

Figure 16 plots CD_t from $t = 2011$ to $t = 2017$ for Hispanic individuals and non-citizens along with the 95% confidence intervals. The estimated policy value for the Hispanic population starts around 30 miles in 2011, increased to around 70 miles in 2012, almost linearly decreased to -40 miles in 2015, and increased again linearly to around 80 miles in 2017.⁹ The estimated policy value for non-citizens starts around -30 miles in 2011, decreased to around -80 miles in 2012, and increased to around 60 miles in 2013. Beginning in 2013, the estimates follow similar trends as the estimates for Hispanic individual, a V-shape that decreased to around -30 miles in 2015 and increased to around 80 miles in 2017.

Overall, the estimated value of the policies appear to be very small. With the average magnitudes of 45 and 50 miles, it is unlikely that sanctuary city policies along act as a sufficient amenity for migration decision. These estimates are consistent with the largely-null results shown in Section 4.

6 Conclusion

This study examines the value of sanctuary city policies as an amenity and the effects of the policies on city-level demographic, socioeconomic, and crime outcomes. Using a panel of U.S. metropolitan statistical areas from 2006 to 2018, I assess whether these policies influenced marginal migration decisions and whether that can lead to changes in aggregate outcomes. I find that the function of sanctuary city policies change overtime from being a push factor to being a pull factor at the individual choice level. However, these results did not result in substantial changes in demographic and socioeconomic outcomes at the city-level. Notably, the policies appear to have a positive effect on safety.

Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach, I find that out-migration appears to increase after a city becomes sanctuary with little change to in-migration. A further look at the migrating population shows that while the average in-migrant's adjusted gross income appears to increase after policy adoption, the policy has no effect on the average out-migrant's adjusted gross income level. In terms of city characteristics, I find that the policies had largely null effects on demographics and socioeconomic outcomes, further suggesting that sanctuary policies do not function as a strong driver of urban change. In terms of the labor market, the policies appear to weakly decrease the share of citizen non-wage-earners and the unemployment rates of sanctuary cities. I examine the policies' effects on crime outcomes, which have been central to political debates on sanctuary policies, by looking at both reported crime rates and victimization rates. The estimates show that sanctuary cities experience a weak increase in crime reporting and a decrease in violent crime victimization.

⁹Positive compensating distance x means that the policy provides the same amount of value as if the city is x miles closer.

To further unpack the largely-null results, I examine the individual migration decisions using a hedonic model in which migrants value private and social amenities while assessing whether sanctuary city policies function as an amenity for the marginal mover. I found that sanctuary city policies act as weak pull factors in migration decisions in that it slightly reduces the conditional probability of a resident moving away. This result is more salient for Hispanic as well as non-citizen individuals, decreasing their out-migrating probability by roughly 3 percentage points after 2014. In terms of compensating distances, I find that the Hispanic population and the non-citizen population have polarizing initial perception of the policy that later converged and fluctuated together. In 2012, the Hispanic population perceived the policy to virtually move a sanctuary city 70 miles closer to them, while the non-citizen population perceived the policy to virtually move a sanctuary city 80 miles farther from them. Consistent with the largely-null estimated policy effects, these results suggest that migration patterns are driven primarily by broader city-level characteristics while sanctuary policies play a limited role.

Future work should explore these questions using richer individual-level data that captures long-term mobility at finer geographic regions. While this study demonstrates that sanctuary policies align with broader demographic trends rather than driving them, further research could examine how these policies interact with immigration enforcement, labor market segmentation, and housing affordability. More broadly, this study highlights the value of assessing local policy effects in a dynamic urban context, where policies may shape perceptions and symbolic commitments without necessarily inducing compositional changes. By refining our understanding of how policies like these influence migration and urban dynamics, future research can contribute to a more precise and empirically grounded debate on the role of local immigration policies in shaping U.S. cities.

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7 Figures

Figure 2: Timeline of Sanctuary City Policy Adoption by MSAs Up to 2017




Figure 3: Share of Movers Moving from/to Ever-Sanctuary MSAs





Figure 4: Share of Movers Moving from/to Sanctuary MSAs



Notes: SC stands for sanctuary cities and NSC stands for non-sanctuary cities.

Figure 5: Predictors of Sanctuary City Policies




Figure 6: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Migration




Figure 7: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Average AGI of Migrants




Figure 8: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Race/Citizenship




Figure 9: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Distribution of Wage Income of Citizens




Figure 10: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Distribution of Wage Income of Non-Citizens




Figure 11: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Socioeconomics Outcomes




Figure 12: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Crime




Figure 13: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Crime Victimization




Figure 14: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Crime, NCVS Sample






Figure 15: Average Marginal Effects of Sanctuary City Policies on the Probability of Out-Migration



Note: The black dashed-line is the pooled estimates of the entire population.

Figure 16: Compensating Distance of Sanctuary City Policies



Note: Coefficients are estimated with data from 2011 to 2017. The indicator of sanctuary city policy is interacted with indicators of each year, yielding point estimates across time while holding the coefficient of distance fixed. Positive distance means having sanctuary policy yields the same indirect utility as if the destination city is closer. The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

8 Tables

Table 1: Sanctuary City Policy Timeline

Policy Year	MSA
2008	Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
2008	Lebanon, PA
2011	Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
2011	Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
2011	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
2012	Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI
2012	Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA
2012	Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
2013	New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
2014	Albuquerque, NM
2014	Bakersfield, CA
2014	Bellingham, WA
2014	Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
2014	Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT
2014	Chico, CA
2014	Colorado Springs, CO
2014	Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
2014	Erie, PA
2014	Eugene, OR
2014	Fort Collins, CO
2014	Grand Junction, CO
2014	Las Cruces, NM
2014	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
2014	Madera, CA
2014	Medford, OR
2014	Merced, CA
2014	Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
2014	Modesto, CA
2014	Napa, CA
2014	New Haven-Milford, CT

2014	Norwich-New London, CT
2014	Olympia-Tumwater, WA
2014	Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA
2014	Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA
2014	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
2014	Pittsburgh, PA
2014	Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
2014	Pueblo, CO
2014	Redding, CA
2014	Richmond, VA
2014	Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
2014	Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA
2014	Salinas, CA
2014	San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
2014	San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
2014	San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles-Arroyo Grande, CA
2014	Santa Fe, NM
2014	Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA
2014	Santa Rosa, CA
2014	Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
2014	Stockton-Lodi, CA
2014	Vallejo-Fairfield, CA
2014	Worcester, MA-CT
2014	Yuba City, CA
2014	CA, CO, CT, RI, and NM
2015	Fresno, CA
2015	Gainesville, FL
2016	New Orleans-Metairie, LA
2017	Austin-Round Rock, TX
2017	Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
2017	Iowa City, IA
2017	Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
2017	Visalia-Porterville, CA

The following MSAs are excluded here due to changing MSA status

2014	Williamsport, PA
2014	Bend-Redmond, OR
2014	El Centro, CA
2014	Greeley, CO
2014	Hanford-Corcoran, CA
2017	Ithaca, NY

Table 2: Household and Individual Characteristics By Ever Sanctuary Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2006		2014		2018	
Ever Sanctuary?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Population Size (1,000's)	658.1	1,854.2	727.4	1,976.4	757.5	2,016.9
Racial Heterogeneity						
DUH	7.9	12.9	9.7	14.6	10.4	15.2
GSI	36.0	46.0	39.9	49.4	41.3	50.6
SE	68.5	86.3	75.6	91.8	78.3	94.1
Population Flow						
% Moved Away	4.2	4.1	4.3	3.9	.	.
% Stayed	82.0	81.4	84.2	84.2	84.8	85.3
% Within City	11.2	11.4	9.3	9.0	8.7	8.3
% Moved Within State	3.3	3.8	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.5
% Moved Across State	3.0	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.3
% Moved From Abroad	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6
Household Characteristics						
% \leq 100% Poverty Line	19.3	17.7	20.6	19.2	19.1	17.5
% \leq 185% Poverty Line	33.8	30.6	36.0	33.4	33.2	29.9
% Own Housing	73.1	68.5	69.9	64.5	70.2	65.5
Household Income						
25th Percentile	24,791.0	29,121.6	27,205.1	31,409.5	30,902.8	36,745.2
Median	48,212.7	56,978.8	54,259.3	63,848.9	61,069.3	74,288.9
75th Percentile	147,462.5	102,832.6	104,602.4	118,088.9	114,630.3	136,745.2
Monthly Rental Cost						
Average	719.1	914.8	870.5	1,126.2	960.6	1,279.5
Median	681.6	854.8	821.5	1,053.0	910.3	1,221.5
Monthly Owning Cost						
Median	1,054.7	1,583.5	1,074.9	1,528.1	1,117.2	1,654.7
Individual Characteristics						
% Female	50.9	50.4	50.8	50.6	50.8	50.5
% White	73.5	64.6	70.0	60.1	68.5	58.4
% Black	12.7	7.6	13.5	7.9	13.8	8.1
% Asian and Other	2.5	5.7	3.0	6.6	3.3	7.0
% American Indian	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
% Hispanic	10.6	21.5	12.9	24.8	13.7	25.9
% Born Citizen	92.9	85.5	92.1	85.1	91.9	84.6
% Naturalized Citizen	2.7	5.7	3.3	6.7	3.8	7.3
% Not Citizen	4.4	8.8	4.5	8.2	4.3	8.0
% \leq High School	30.9	31.3	28.0	28.7	26.6	27.3
% \geq College	16.8	19.9	18.9	22.2	20.6	24.4
% Employed	47.5	48.2	46.3	46.9	47.5	48.6
% Unemployed	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.9	2.5	2.7
% Not in Labor Force	27.6	26.5	29.8	28.6	30.2	28.7
% Married	40.9	39.7	38.9	38.2	38.9	38.4
% Single	43.7	46.0	45.3	47.4	45.7	47.5
Reported Crime (per 1,000 resident)						
Property	1,035.2	1,032.7	1,027.4	1,025.9	1,022.1	1,022.5
Violent	16.8	12.8	14.2	10.6	14.0	11.2
Crime Victimization (per 1,000 resident)						
Property	81.5	85.2	54.7	60.5	.	.
Violent	32.8	32.4	25.9	25.5	.	.
Number of MSAs	162	62	162	62	162	62

Appendix A Robustness Check Figures

IRS-SOI Migration Outcomes

Figure A1: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % In-Migration of Tax Filers, Different Samples




Figure A2: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % Out-Migration of Tax Filers, Different Samples




Figure A3: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Average Adjusted Gross Income of In-Migrants, Different Samples





Figure A4: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Average Adjusted Gross Income of Out-Migrants, Different Samples



ACS Demographic Characteristics

Figure A5: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % Hispanic, Different Samples




Figure A6: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % Non-Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A7: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Racial Heterogeneity (DUH), Different Samples





Figure A8: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Racial Heterogeneity (GSI), Different Samples



ACS Wage Income By Citizenship Status

Figure A9: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % Non-Earners Among Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A10: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of First Quartile Wage Income Among Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A11: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Median Wage Income Among Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A12: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Third Quartile Wage Income Among Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A13: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, % Non-Earners Among Non-Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A14: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of First Quartile Wage Income Among Non-Citizens, Different Samples




Figure A15: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Median Wage Income Among Non-Citizens, Different Samples





Figure A16: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Third Quartile Wage Income Among Non-Citizens, Different Samples



ACS Socioeconomic Characteristics

Figure A17: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Median Household Income, Different Samples





Figure A18: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Log of Median Cost of Renting, Different Samples



UCR Reported Crime Rates

Figure A19: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Actual Violent Crime, Different Samples




Figure A20: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Actual Property Crime, Different Samples




Figure A21: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Unfounded Violent Crime, Different Samples





Figure A22: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, Reported Unfounded Property Crime, Different Samples



NCVS Crime Victimization

Figure A23: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, NCVS Violent Crime Victimization, Different Samples





Figure A24: Estimated Treatment Effects Across Policy Timeline, NCVS Property Crime Victimization, Different Samples



Appendix B ICE Declined Detainer Report

This report had been [archived](#). I used the table starting from *Section III: Table of Jurisdictions that have Enacted Policies which Restrict Cooperation with ICE* (page 10 of the report) to construct the sanctuary city policy adoption timeline, with the exception of Clarion county, PA (2007).



ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS

Weekly Declined Detainer Outcome Report
For Recorded Declined Detainers Feb 11 – Feb 17, 2017

Summary

Pursuant to section 9(b) of [Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States](#), and section H of the Secretary of Homeland Security's subsequent implementation memo, [Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest](#), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is making available for public release the non-Federal jurisdictions that do not honor detainers issued by ICE to that jurisdiction. For instances of declined detainers, the report also includes the associated individual's citizenship, detainer issued and declined dates, and notable criminal activity. ICE compiled this report based on jurisdictions with detainers that were recorded as declined between February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017, regardless of detainer issuance date.

It should be noted that law enforcement agencies (LEA) do not generally advise ICE of when a detainer is not honored, and therefore this report represents declined detainers that ICE personnel have become aware of during their enforcement activities.

This report is comprised of four sections:

- Section I: Highest Volume of Detainers Issued between February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017 to Jurisdictions which Restrict Cooperation with ICE
- Section II: Jurisdictions with Recorded Declined Detainers between February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017
- Section III: Table of Jurisdictions that have Enacted Policies which Restrict Cooperation with ICE
- Section IV: Report Scope and Data Fidelity

Section I: Highest Volume of Detainers Issued between February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017 to Jurisdictions¹ which Restrict Cooperation with ICE

During the week of February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017, ICE issued 2,868 detainers throughout the United States. The following table reflects the jurisdictions that do not comply with detainers on a routine basis, which had the highest volume of detainers issued during the reporting period (315 to these eleven detention locations during the reporting period). While these jurisdictions have a policy of non-cooperation or restricted cooperation, the outcome of these specific detainers is yet to be determined. Consistent with these jurisdictions' policies, ICE expects these detainers to reflect as declined in Section II of future weekly reports.

As further noted in Section IV, ICE field offices have been instructed to resume issuing detainers on all removable aliens in a LEA's custody regardless of prior non-cooperation. **As a result, the number of issued detainers will increase over the next several reporting periods.**

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Issued Detainers
LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL-TWIN TOWER	Los Angeles	California	78
MARICOPA COUNTY JAIL	Maricopa	Arizona	67
ORANGE COUNTY JAIL	Orange	California	35
LOS ANGELES CITY JAIL	Los Angeles	California	33
HENNEPIN COUNTY ADC	Hennepin	Minnesota	15
RIKERS ISLAND, QUEENS, NY	New York City	New York	15
SAN FRANCISCO CO JAIL	San Francisco	California	15
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY JAIL	Santa Barbara	California	15
BROOKLYN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City	New York	14
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City	New York	14
SANTA CLARA CO MAIN JAIL	Santa Clara	California	14

¹ Jurisdictions include counties, boroughs, and parishes

Section II: Jurisdictions² with Recorded Declined Detainers February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017

The following table describes the individuals released by detention location that declined detainers during the period.³

In sum, these jurisdictions declined 65 detainers issued by ICE⁴.

The table also provides the associated country of citizenship, detainer issue and decline dates, and a notable criminal activity (charge or conviction) associated with the individual released from custody. The entries below are sorted alphabetically by state.⁵ Note that an alien may have been subject to detainers in multiple jurisdictions during the time period reported.

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
SANTA RITA JAIL-ALAMEDA COUNTY	Alameda*	California*	Mexico	2/14/2017	2/13/2017	Weapon Offense (Conviction)
CONTRA COSTA CO. JAIL	Contra Costa*	California*	Mexico	2/15/2017	11/14/2016	Domestic Violence (Charged)
MADERA CO DEPT OF CORRECT	Madera*	California*	Mexico	2/17/2017	10/14/2016	Drug Possession (Conviction)
ORANGE COUNTY JAIL	Orange*	California*	Mexico	2/14/2017	1/16/2017	Weapon Offense (Conviction)
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF	Riverside*	California*	Mexico	2/15/2017	2/12/2015	Domestic Violence (Conviction)

² Jurisdictions include counties, boroughs, and parishes.

³ According to the reporting described in Section IV.

⁴ When a detainer is declined, the alien is generally released back into the community. However, there may be some instances, where despite a detainer being declined, ICE does take custody of the alien. This could occur, for example, when the alien is transferred to another jurisdiction that honors detainers, or when ICE officers make special efforts to take custody of the alien when the LEA does not meet ICE's reasonable expectations to prevent the release of a criminal alien back into the public.

⁵ An asterisk(*) after the jurisdiction name or state indicates that a policy is in place that limits or prohibits cooperation with ICE; policy details can be found in Section III.

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF	Riverside*	California*	Guatemala	2/15/2017	6/30/2015	Sex Assault (Charged)
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF	Riverside*	California*	El Salvador	2/15/2017	1/30/2017	Domestic Violence (Charged)
SOUTHWEST DETENTION FACILITY	Riverside*	California*	Mexico	2/15/2017	12/7/2010	Cocaine - Possession (Charged)
SAN BERNARDINO SHERIFF - ADELANTO FACILITY	San Bernardino*	California*	Mexico	2/15/2017	10/16/2014	Marijuana - Possession (Charged)
SAN FRANCISCO CO JAIL	San Francisco*	California*	Cuba	2/16/2017	2/16/2017	Assault (Conviction)
SONOMA CO MAIN ADULT DET	Sonoma*	California*	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/16/2017	Assault (Conviction)
BROWARD COUNTY JAIL	Broward	Florida	Honduras	2/13/2017	2/13/2017	Battery (Charged)
MARION COUNTY JAIL	Marion	Florida	Mexico	2/15/2017	2/15/2017	Perjury (Conviction)
MARION COUNTY JAIL	Marion	Florida	Mexico	2/15/2017	2/15/2017	Traffic Offense (Charged)
ORANGE COUNTY JAIL	Orange	Florida	Honduras	2/17/2017	12/2/2016	Cocaine - Possession (Charged)
ORANGE COUNTY JAIL	Orange	Florida	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Traffic Offense (Charged)

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
SIOUX COUNTY JAIL	Sioux*	Iowa	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/16/2017	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Charged)
HENNEPIN COUNTY ADC	Hennepin*	Minnesota	Guatemala	2/17/2017	6/13/2016	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Charged)
YELLOW MEDICINE COUNTY JAIL	Yellow Medicine	Minnesota	Mexico	2/13/2017	2/10/2017	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Charged)
CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL	Camden*	New Jersey	Guatemala	2/14/2017	2/7/2017	Domestic Violence (Conviction)
CURRY COUNTY DET FAC	Curry*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/13/2017	9/22/2012	Marijuana - Sell (Conviction)
CURRY COUNTY DET FAC	Curry*	New Mexico	Honduras	2/13/2017	9/6/2016	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Conviction)
CURRY COUNTY DET FAC	Curry*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/13/2017	1/22/2014	Battery (Conviction)
LEA COUNTY CORR. FAC.	Lea*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/13/2017	9/4/2013	Aggravated Assault - Police Officer-Strongarm (Charged)
LEA COUNTY JAIL	Lea*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/16/2017	11/15/2016	Assault (Conviction)
LEA COUNTY JAIL	Lea*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/17/2017	4/20/2016	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Conviction)
SANDOVAL COUNTY DET CTR	Sandoval*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/13/2017	9/29/2012	Traffic Offense (Charged)
SANTA FE COUNTY JAIL	Santa Fe*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/15/2017	6/24/2016	Assault (Conviction)

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
SANTA FE COUNTY JAIL	Santa Fe*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/16/2017	11/14/2016	Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Conviction)
SANTA FE COUNTY JAIL	Santa Fe*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/13/2017	2/12/2017	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Conviction)
SANTA FE COUNTY JAIL	Santa Fe*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/14/2017	2/10/2017	Dangerous Drugs (Charged)
SANTA FE COUNTY JAIL	Santa Fe*	New Mexico	Mexico	2/14/2017	4/11/2014	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Charged)
BROOKLYN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Ussr	2/15/2017	2/15/2017	Sex Assault - Carnal Abuse (Conviction)
BROOKLYN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Burkina Faso	2/14/2017	2/14/2017	Robbery (Charged)
MANHATTAN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Dominican Republic	2/15/2017	1/30/2017	Heroin - Sell (Conviction)
MANHATTAN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	China, Peoples Republic of	2/12/2017	2/8/2017	Sex Assault - Carnal Abuse (Charged)
MANHATTAN CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Nigeria	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Larceny (Charged)
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Mexico	2/14/2017	2/14/2017	Assault (Charged)
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Dominican Republic	2/13/2017	2/8/2017	Intimidation (Charged)

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	China, Peoples Republic of	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Dangerous Drugs (Charged)
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Ecuador	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Larceny (Charged)
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	China, Peoples Republic of	2/13/2017	2/8/2017	Fraud (Charged)
QUEENS CENTRAL BOOKING	New York City*	New York	Philippines	2/13/2017	2/13/2017	Violation of a Court Order (Charged)
RIKERS ISLAND, QUEENS, NY	New York City*	New York	El Salvador	2/16/2017	5/3/2016	Possession Of Weapon (Conviction)
RIKERS ISLAND, QUEENS, NY	New York City*	New York	Bangladesh	2/15/2017	2/3/2017	Larceny (Conviction)
RIKERS ISLAND, QUEENS, NY	New York City*	New York	India	2/17/2017	2/14/2017	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Charged)
FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL	Franklin	Ohio	Egypt	2/11/2017	2/7/2017	Domestic Violence (Conviction)
FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL	Franklin	Ohio	Mexico	2/16/2017	10/7/2016	Driving Under Influence Liquor (Conviction)
FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL	Franklin	Ohio	Mexico	2/14/2017	2/8/2017	Assault (Charged)
FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL	Franklin	Ohio	Mexico	2/14/2017	2/8/2017	Domestic Violence (Charged)
MULTNOMAH COUNTY JAIL	Multnomah*	Oregon	Mexico	2/15/2017	3/21/2016	Sex Assault (Conviction)

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
CURRAN FROMHOLD CORR.FAC.	Philadelphia*	Pennsylvania	Mexico	2/11/2017	2/10/2017	Threat Terroristic State Offenses (Charged)
CURRAN FROMHOLD CORR.FAC.	Philadelphia*	Pennsylvania	Mexico	2/16/2017	2/6/2017	Larceny (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/16/2017	2/16/2017	Drug Possession (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Cuba	2/15/2017	2/15/2017	Assault (Conviction)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Burglary (Conviction)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Larceny (Conviction)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/13/2017	2/12/2017	Assault (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Guatemala	2/13/2017	2/13/2017	Assault (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/16/2017	2/16/2017	Domestic Violence (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Domestic Violence (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Domestic Violence (Charged)
TRAVIS COUNTY JAIL	Travis*	Texas	Mexico	2/17/2017	2/17/2017	Drug Possession (Charged)

Detention Location	Jurisdiction	State	Citizenship	Detainer Decline Date	Detainer Issue Date	Notable Criminal Activity
COWLITZ COUNTY JAIL	Cowlitz*	Washington	Mexico	2/13/2017	2/13/2017	Licensing Violation (Charged)
KING COUNTY ADULT JAIL	King*	Washington	Somalia	2/13/2017	10/20/2016	Cocaine - Sell (Conviction)

Section III: Table of Jurisdictions that have Enacted Policies which Restrict Cooperation with ICE

All jurisdictions and their corresponding detainer ordinances listed in this document are based upon public announcements, news report statements, and publicly disclosed policies. As such, there may be other non-cooperative jurisdictions not contained in this table if publicly available information does not exist. The entries below are sorted by the date a policy was enacted in the stated jurisdiction with the most recent date first.

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Baltimore City, Maryland (Baltimore)	March 2017	Baltimore Police Commissioner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public statement of noncooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Maricopa, Arizona (Phoenix)	February 2017	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maricopa County will not honor requests to hold individual
Tulare, California (San Francisco)	February 2017	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will notify ICE five days prior to the inmates release but will not hold
Ithaca, New York (Buffalo)	February 2017	Municipal Code Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will only honor "warrantless detainer requests from the federal government under limited, specified circumstances" such as violent or serious crimes or terrorist activities
City of Seattle, Washington (Seattle)	February 2017	Resolution 31730	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> City department directors are directed to comply with City's practice to defer to King County on all ICE detainer requests City of Seattle employees are directed, unless provided with a criminal warrant issued by a federal judge or magistrate, to not detain or arrest any individual based upon an administrative or civil immigration warrant for a violation of federal civil immigration law, including administrative and civil immigration warrants entered in the National Crime Information Center database
Travis County, Texas (San Antonio)	January 2017	Travis County Sheriff's Office Policy on Cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Willing to accept requests accompanied by a court order Willing to accept requests when the subject of the detainer request is charged with or has been convicted of Capital Murder, First Degree Murder, Aggravated Sexual Assault, or Continuous Smuggling of Persons
Iowa City, Johnson County, Iowa (Saint Paul)	January 2017	Resolution Reaffirming the Public Safety Function of Local Law Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Willing to only accept some notifications on detainees

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Boulder, Colorado (Denver)	January 2017	Boulder Municipal Code Title 12, Chapter 12-5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainers unless ICE has an arrest warrant for an individual
Montpelier, Vermont (Boston)	July 2016	Fair and Impartial Policing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals based solely on an ICE detainer
San Francisco, California (San Francisco)	July 2016	City Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detain an individual on the basis of a civil immigration detainer after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody.
New Orleans, Louisiana (New Orleans)	February 2016	New Orleans Police Department Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor detainer without a judicial order or criminal warrant
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	January 2016	Mayoral Executive Order (Reverts back to April 2014 policy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Willing to only honor ICE detainers where the alien has a prior conviction for a first or second degree felony offense involving violence and the detainer is accompanied by a judicial arrest warrant The order also prohibits notice to ICE of pending release of subjects of interest to ICE unless the above criteria is met
Alachua, Florida (Miami)	September 2015	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a judicial order or criminal warrant
Amador County, California (San Francisco)	August 2015	Sheriff Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying court order to honor detainer.
San Mateo, California (San Francisco)	July 2015	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> San Mateo County Sheriff's Office also does not honor Immigration and Customs Enforcement requests to detain those in the country illegally except in rare cases when the individual poses a significant threat to public safety
Humboldt, California (San Francisco)	May 2015	County Correctional Facility Procedure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under no circumstance shall an individual subject to deportation, absent a federal arrest warrant, be held past their release date or prevented from posting bail.
Fresno, California (San Francisco)	February 2015	Fresno County Sheriff's Administrative Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICE Detainers will continue to be accepted and added. However, the detainer will not serve as a hold, or delay an inmate's release beyond the scheduled date of release.
San Benito County, California (San Francisco)	February 2015	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a judicial determination of probable cause or a warrant from a judicial officer.

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Arlington County, Virginia (Washington)	January 2015	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor an ICE detainer unless ICE first presents the sheriff's office with a judicially issued warrant authorizing detention
San Miguel, New Mexico (El Paso)	December 2014	San Miguel Detention Policies and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will only detain if reimbursed
Chesterfield County, Virginia (Washington)	November 2014	County Jail Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The county will notify ICE when a detainee is going to be released, however, they will not hold an individual for any additional time.
New York City, New York (New York City)	November 2014	Local Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Erie County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	October 2014	County Jails' Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals based on the standard I-247 ICE detainer form Will hold individuals if an I-203 Order to Detain and an I-200 Warrant of Arrest form is submitted Will send a list of currently held individuals upon request Will allow ICE to inspect jail at any time and to ride-along with local law enforcement
Lycoming County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	October 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals solely on ICE detainers Will notify ICE two hours prior of an inmate's release if ICE had issued a detainer
Montour County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	October 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainers
Perry County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	October 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainers without a warrant or court order Will not arrest, detain, or transport anyone solely based on an immigration detainer or an administrative warrant
New Mexico County Jails, New Mexico (El Paso)	October 2014	County Jails' Decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All county jails in New Mexico will not honor ICE detainer
Montgomery County, Maryland (Baltimore)	October 2014	County Executive's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainers without adequate probable cause
Prince George's County, Maryland (Baltimore)	October 2014	County Executive's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Department of Corrections will not honor ICE detainers without a warrant signed by a judge that demonstrates probable cause

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Butler County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	September 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals solely on an ICE detainer Staff will allow ICE officials to have access to inmates
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	September 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a judicially authorized warrant or court order
Colorado County Jails, Colorado (Denver)	September 2014	County Jails' Decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All county jails in Colorado will not honor ICE detainer without a Judicial Warrant
Sarpy County, Nebraska (St. Paul)	September 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a warrant
King County, Washington (Seattle)	September 2014	Ordinance 17886	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will only honor civil immigration hold requests from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement for individuals that are accompanied by a criminal warrant issued by a U.S. District Court judge or magistrate
Burlington County, New Jersey (Newark)	August 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE request to hold.
Delaware, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	August 2014	Correctional Facility's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals solely based on an ICE detainer Arrangements may be made for "in person" review of the policy
Northampton, Massachusetts (Boston)	August 2014	Mayoral Executive Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer that is non-criminal and not subject to a judicially issued warrant
Boston, Massachusetts (Boston)	August 2014	Boston Trust Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a criminal warrant
Del-Norte County, California (San Francisco)	August 2014	Del Norte Sheriff's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All inmates being detained at the Del Norte County Jail on an immigration detainer issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.) must be accompanied by a judicial determination of probable cause or a judicial warrant.
El Dorado County, California (San Francisco)	August 2014	Sheriff's Office Procedural Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A person may not be held in custody solely on the basis of an immigration detainer if he or she is otherwise eligible for release from criminal custody unless a judicially approved warrant is issued.
Iowa County, Iowa (St. Paul)	August 2014	County Jail's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless a judge has approved the move with a probable cause warrant

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Benton County, Iowa (St. Paul)	August 2014	County Jail's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless a judge has approved the move with a probable cause warrant
Union County, New Jersey (Newark)	August 2014	County Counsel's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without warrant, court order, or other legally sufficient proof of probable cause from ICE
Archuleta, Colorado (Denver)	July 2014	Sheriff's Directive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold beyond release date but will notify
Bernalillo, New Mexico (El Paso)	July 2014	Immigration Detainers and Warrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not detain any inmate and will not delay the otherwise authorized release of any inmate, as a result of detainer requests or administrative warrants received by ICE.
Butte County, California (San Francisco)	July 2014	Sheriff's Office Order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying arrest warrant to honor detainer.
Camden County, New Jersey (Newark)	July 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires court order or arrest warrant
Dona Ana County, New Mexico (El Paso)	July 2014	County Detention Center Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor detainer
Los Angeles County, California (Los Angeles)	July 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a judicial determination of probable cause or a warrant from a judicial officer.
Placer, California (San Francisco)	July 2014	Placer County Sheriff Office Procedure Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No longer accept detainers unless they are accompanied by an arrest warrant signed by a judge.
Wayne County, New York (Buffalo)	July 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a judicial warrant signed by a Federal judge or magistrate
Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Rhode Island (Boston)	July 2014	Department of Corrections Policy from Governor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a warrant

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Hall County, Nebraska (St. Paul)	July 2014	County Corrections Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hall County Corrections will not honor ICE detainer without a warrant
Middlesex County, New Jersey (Newark)	July 2014	County Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless an individual: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is charged with a first- or second-degree crime; Is identified as a known gang member; or Has been subject to a final order of removal by ICE
Hennepin, Minnesota (Saint Paul)	July 2014	Sheriff Statement on U.S. Immigration and Customs Detainers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer absent judicial authority
Imperial County, California (San Diego)	July 2014	Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying court order to honor detainer.
Rio Arriba, New Mexico (El Paso)	July 2014	County Jail Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Santa Fe, New Mexico (El Paso)	July 2014	County Jail Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE unless the individual is accused of a serious crime
Yolo, California (San Francisco)	July 2014	Sheriff Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a valid and enforceable warrant signed by a judicial officer.
Bradford County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	June 2014	County Correctional Facility's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without paperwork that an individual has a criminal warrant or a criminal conviction Will not hold individuals solely for the detainer and will request further information should they receive a detainer
Butler County, Kansas (Chicago)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a court order or warrant
Cambridge, Massachusetts (Boston)	June 2014	City Council Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless in cases where immigration agents have a criminal warrant or Cambridge officials have a legitimate law enforcement purpose not related to immigration

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
East Haven, Connecticut (Boston)	June 2014	East Haven Police Department Policies and Procedures No. 428.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Finney County, Kansas (Chicago)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without probable cause or a warrant
Harvey County, Kansas (Chicago)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a court order or warrant
Kings County, California (San Francisco)	June 2014	Sheriff's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is the policy of the Kings County Sheriff's Office to refrain from honoring detention requests from ICE ("ICE Holds") unless the request is accompanied by a valid and enforceable warrant signed by a judicial officer.
Merced, California (San Francisco)	June 2014	Sheriff Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Sheriff's Office will no longer place Immigration Detainers (ICE Holds) on inmates in our custody, save for exceptional circumstances, and then only with the approval of the Sheriff or his command level staff and consistent with the law.
Mono County, California (San Francisco)	June 2014	Custody Services Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Department will not hold a person in custody beyond any applicable release date for the sole reason that ICE requested the Department to hold that person in custody.
Orange County, California (Los Angeles)	June 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a judicial determination of probable cause or a warrant from a judicial officer.
San Joaquin, California (San Francisco)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The San Joaquin County Jail will no longer honor immigration detainers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) placed by an Immigrations and Customs Agent. This does not apply to arrest warrants signed by a judge.
San Luis Obispo County, California (Los Angeles)	June 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sheriff's Office will not detain the inmate on the basis of an Immigration Detainer past his or her scheduled release date.
Sedgwick County, Kansas (Chicago)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a court order or warrant
Shawnee County, Kansas (Chicago)	June 2014	Sheriff's Directive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor detainers without additional probable cause

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Sioux County, Iowa (St. Paul)	June 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless a judge has approved the move with a probable cause warrant
Alameda County, California (San Francisco)	May 2014	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No longer accept detainers unless they are accompanied by an arrest warrant signed by a judge.
Aurora Detention Center, Aurora Colorado (Denver)	May 2014	Detention Center Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Chester County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	May 2014	County Prison's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not detain individuals solely based on an ICE detainer Will allow ICE agents access to daily population reports and notify ICE of pending release from custody
Clallam County, Washington (Seattle)	May 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Contra Costa County, California (San Francisco)	May 2014	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying arrest warrant to honor detainer.
Delta County, Colorado (Denver)	May 2014	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will notify five days prior to release but will not honor detainer
Inyo County, California (San Francisco)	May 2014	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying arrest warrant to honor detainer
Jefferson County, Washington (Seattle)	May 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Lehigh County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	May 2014	Board of Commissioners Resolution 2014-36	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without a judicially issued detainer, warrant, or order
Mendocino County, California (San Francisco)	May 2014	Mendocino County Sheriff's Policy and Procedure Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a valid and enforceable warrant.
San Bernardino, California (Los Angeles)	May 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detainers must be accompanied by a signed court order.

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
San Juan County, Washington (Seattle)	May 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Santa Barbara County, California (Los Angeles)	May 2014	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires a judicial determination of probable cause or a warrant from a judicial officer.
Skagit County, Washington (Seattle)	May 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Somerville, Massachusetts (Boston)	May 2014	Mayoral Executive Order and Board of Alderman Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless ICE provides criminal warrant or if there is a legitimate law enforcement purpose beyond immigration status for keeping a suspect in custody after bail is posted or a judge releases the individual
Sutter County, California (San Francisco)	May 2014	Sutter County Jail Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will continue to notify ICE when we have a possible immigration violation Will not hold someone past the time their local charges would otherwise cause them to be released.
Whatcom County, Washington (Seattle)	May 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer Will provide ICE access to detainees for investigative purposes and notify ICE of pending releases
Baker County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Bucks County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	April 2014	County Department of Corrections Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold solely on an ICE detainer, but will notify ICE via email of a pending release from custody
Clackamas County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless there is probable cause for such detention
Clark County, Washington (Seattle)	April 2014	Chief Jail Deputy's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer unless ICE provides an affidavit of probable cause
Clatsop County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Coos County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Cowlitz County, Washington (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Deschutes County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Douglas County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Grant County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Jackson County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Jefferson County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Josephine County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Lincoln County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Malheur County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Marion County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	April 2014	County Correctional Facility's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer Will not accept anyone brought to it solely on an ICE detainer Has daily contact with ICE
Multnomah County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Polk County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Springfield Police Department, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	Department Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Snohomish County, Washington (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Thurston County, Washington (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Tillamook County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Union County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Walla Walla County, Washington	April 2014	Special Order 2014-002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals on the authority of an ICE detainer
Wallowa County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Washington County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant Sheriff's office will now only send a daily roster of foreign-born individuals in county custody instead of notifying ICE of each person individually
Yamhill County, Oregon (Seattle)	April 2014	County Sheriff's Office Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer without court order or warrant
Napa, California (San Francisco)	February 2014	Napa County Sheriff's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A deputy should consider the seriousness of the offense, community safety, potential burden on ICE, and the impact on the immigrant community when determining whether or not to notify ICE.
Yuba, California (San Francisco)	January 2014	Yuba County Jail Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Yuba County Sheriff's Department will no longer accept ICE detainers for foreign born arrestees.

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
California	January 2014	Trust Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On January 1, 2014, California's AB 4, also known as the Trust Act, went into effect, specifying that local law enforcement agencies need only honor ICE detainers for aliens who meet at least one of the following criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specific serious or violent felony conviction; Felony conviction punishable by state imprisonment; Specific sexual crimes conviction; Misdemeanor conviction within the past five years for a crime that is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony, or conviction at any time of a felony for specified offenses Federal conviction that meets the definition of aggravated felony; Outstanding federal felony arrest warrant as identified by ICE; Arrested and taken before a magistrate on a serious or felony charge other than domestic violence and warranting a probable cause finding; or Currently registered in the California Sex and Arson Registry.
Connecticut	January 2014	Trust Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law enforcement agencies will honor ICE detainers if an individual is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convicted of a felony, Subject to pending criminal charges, has an outstanding arrest warrant, Identified gang member, among other criteria <p>Additionally, Local law enforcement agencies will not enforce ICE Detainer Requests solely on the basis of a final order of removal, unless accompanied by a judicial warrant, or past criminal conviction, unless the conviction is for a violent felony.</p>
Newark, New Jersey (Newark)	July 2013	Newark Police Department General Order 13-04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor ICE detainer
Washington, DC (Washington)	July 2012	Immigration Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires written agreement from ICE reimbursing costs in honoring detainer; and that the alien is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convicted of a dangerous crime; Convicted of a crime of violence within the last 10 years; Convicted of a homicide; or Released in the past five years for these crimes
Chicago, Illinois (Chicago)	July 2012	Municipal Code of Chicago Chapter 2-173-005 and 2-173-042	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has an outstanding criminal warrant; Convicted of a felony; Is a defendant in a criminal case where a judgment has not been entered and a felony charge is pending; or <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified as known gang member

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Chicago)	June 2012	Resolution 12-135	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convicted of at least one felony or two non-traffic misdemeanor offenses; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convicted or charged with any domestic violence offense or any violation of a protective order; Convicted or charged with intoxicated use of a vehicle; Is a defendant in a pending criminal case; Has an outstanding criminal warrant; Identified as known gang member; or Is a possible match on the US terrorist watch list
Amherst, Massachusetts (Boston)	May 2012	Bylaw Regarding Sharing of Information with Federal Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To the extent permissible by law, will not honor immigration detainer requests
Santa Cruz County, California (San Francisco)	May 2012	Board of Supervisors Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not honor detainer unless individual convicted of serious or violent felony
Providence, Rhode Island (Boston)	March 2011	Resolution of the City Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The State of Rhode Island does not honor ICE detainees
Santa Clara County, California (San Francisco)	October 2011	County Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will hold an additional 24 hour period after they would have otherwise be released as long as: (1) all costs incurred are reimbursed by ICE, (2) the individual is convicted of a serious or violent felony for which they are currently in custody, (3) the individual has been convicted of a serious felony in the past 10 years of the request or has been released after serving a sentence for a serious or violent felony within 5 years of the request, whichever is later.
Cook County, Illinois (Chicago)	September 2011	Ordinance 11-0-73; Chapter 46 Law Enforcement, Section 46-37 of Cook County Code	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires written agreement from ICE reimbursing costs in honoring detainer
Taos County, New Mexico (El Paso)	January 2011	Taos County Adult Detention Center Policies and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will only hold aliens with at least one felony or two or more misdemeanors
Lebanon County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	August 2008	County Correctional Facility's Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals solely on ICE detainees Will send weekly reports to ICE about newly incarcerated individuals, and allows ICE to access the facility and records

Jurisdiction (AOR)	Date Enacted	Policy	Criteria for Honoring Detainer
Hartford, Connecticut (Boston)	August 2008	Article XXI - City Services Relating To Immigration Status (Ord. No. 20-08, 8-11-08)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not arrest or detain a person based solely on their immigration status unless there is a criminal warrant
Clarion County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	September 1997	County Corrections Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals solely based on ICE detainer; requires legal and authorized commitment paperwork
Calaveras County, California (San Francisco)	Undated	Jail Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Must be accompanied by federal warrant or judicial determination of probable cause to comply with hold but will notify ICE of release date.
Lake, California (San Francisco)	Undated	County Sheriff Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold inmates in regards to their immigration status.
Glenn County, California (San Francisco)	Undated	Sheriff's Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires an accompanying court order to honor detainer.
Mariposa, California (San Francisco)	Undated	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mariposa County Sheriff's Office Custody Division does not hold or detain persons based exclusively upon a "detainer" or "hold request" issued by the U.S. Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Pike County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia)	Undated	Correctional Facility's Standard Operating Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICE detainers are not acceptable commitment paperwork nor can be used as a valid hold Has a contract with ICE to hold those who are in federal custody pending immigration proceedings
Sacramento County, California (San Francisco)	Undated	Sheriff's Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will not hold individuals past release date

Section IV: Report Scope and Data Fidelity

Operational/Policy

1. Some field offices ceased issuing detainers to known uncooperative jurisdictions. ICE field offices have been recently instructed to issue detainers on all removable aliens in a LEA's custody. As a result, the number of issued detainers is expected to increase over the next several reporting periods.
2. Currently, uncooperative jurisdictions prevent ICE from knowing when an alien has been released from custody. Consequently, active detainers exist for aliens who are no longer incarcerated. The field offices are in the process of reviewing outstanding active ICE detainers, potentially affecting the list of jurisdictions listed in future reporting periods.
3. ICE field offices are also being instructed to update the criminal history information contained within ICE's records at the time of detainer issuance, as ICE does not normally enter criminality until it assumes custody post-processing. Hence, the list of crimes reported for aliens subject to detainers that are subsequently declined may be temporarily under-reported until this new change improves data quality.
4. At present, ICE does not document, in a systematically reportable manner, the immigration status of an alien at time of detainer issuance. ICE sends detainers to law enforcement agencies, which requests aliens be turned over to ICE prior to release, if ICE possesses probable cause to believe that the alien is removable from the United States.

Statistical Reporting

5. ICE will update this report weekly, noting the time period for which it collected data. Data reflected will be 6 weeks past to ensure data integrity.
6. ICE compiled this report based on jurisdictions with detainers that were declined between February 11, 2017 and February 17, 2017, regardless of detainer issuance date. As such, the declined detainers may include a combination of I-247, I-247D, I-247N, and/or I-247X forms.
7. This report should not be considered an exclusive factor in determining a jurisdiction's level of cooperation with and support of ICE or the law enforcement community.
8. The I-247N form and some I-247X forms requested that the LEA provide notice to ICE as early as possible, or as early as practicable before the subject is released from LEA custody (at least 48 hours). This notification is intended to allow ICE time

to respond and take custody of the alien where resources may not be instantly available. This report may reflect instances in which the LEA may have technically provided notification to ICE in advance of an alien's release, but where the LEA did not provide sufficient advance notification for ICE to arrange the transfer of custody prior to release due to geographic limitations, response times, or other logistical reasons. In these instances ICE records the detainer as declined by the LEA.

9. This report does not, nor does it intend to create any rights, privileges, or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States; its departments, agencies, or other entities; its officers or employees; contractors or any other person.